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Categorization is a fundamental ability for efficient behavioral control. It allows organisms
to remember the correct responses to categorical cues and not for every stimulus
encountered (hence eluding computational cost or complexity), and to generalize
appropriate responses to novel stimuli dependant on category assignment. Assuming
the brain performs Bayesian inference, based on a generative model of the external
world and future goals, we propose a computational model of categorization in which
important properties emerge. These properties comprise the ability to infer latent causes
of sensory experience, a hierarchical organization of latent causes, and an explicit
inclusion of context and action representations. Crucially, these aspects derive from
considering the environmental statistics that are relevant to achieve goals, and from
the fundamental Bayesian principle that any generative model should be preferred over
alternative models based on an accuracy-complexity trade-off. Our account is a step
toward elucidating computational principles of categorization and its role within the
Bayesian brain hypothesis.
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INTRODUCTION
Adaptive behavior requires mapping single exemplars of stimuli or cues to their classes. This
categorization saves time and computational resources, since it is unnecessary to learn specific
actions for every exemplar (Rosch, 1973; Rosch et al., 1976; Barsalou, 1983). Furthermore, when
novel stimuli are encountered, these can be assimilated into higher order classes, without the need
to learn from scratch the behavioral response to each novel stimulus (Rosch, 1973; Rosch et al.,
1976). For instance, consider the burden of learning an appropriate action (say, approach, or
escape) for each new exemplar of animal encountered, such as a new predator or prey. Instead,
we are able to immediately associate new animals with an appropriate category and to perform
appropriate actions, like escaping a predator or approaching a prey.
The normative principles underlying categorization are the focus of rational theories. Some
theories assume that categories are given a priori and that the stimulus-category mapping is learnt
in a supervised way by presenting a set of stimulus-category pairs (Rosch, 1975; Homa et al.,
1981; Nosofsky, 1986; Estes, 1994; Smith and Minda, 1998; Lamberts, 2000). A shortcoming of
this perspective is the lack of an obvious explanation as to why category learning is adaptive for
behavior. In other words, why should the brain organize stimuli into behaviorally meaningful
classes?
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One way to address this issue is to postulate an explicit
mapping between categories and appropriate actions. For
instance, the brain could learn to go/stop when a traffic light is
green/red, irrespective of the specific traffic light cueing behavior.
Based on this assumption (as in multi-attribute decision theory;
Ashby and Townsend, 1986; Ashby and Gott, 1988; Maddox and
Ashby, 1993), category learning corresponds to the acquisition of
an adaptive stimulus-response mapping. However, one problem
is that the appropriate stimulus-response mapping might vary
across contexts, so that the same stimuli require particular actions
in one context and other actions in another context (Barsalou
et al., 2003; Barsalou, 2008). For instance, it is appropriate to
run when a lion is encountered in the wild, while it is more
appropriate to admire the same animal in a zoo. In cases like
these, the stimulus category is constant, but the appropriate
(context sensitive) action changes. In other words, a context-
insensitive mapping between categories and actions can be
problematic when the context determines which actions should
be selected. This suggests that a model should accommodate the
importance of context and should explicitly distinguish categories
from actions (Barsalou et al., 2003; Barsalou, 2008; Rigoli et al.,
2016a,b,c).
Another limit of the approaches described above is that
categories (or responses) are established a priori. In other words,
these formulations assume a pre-specified set of categories, while
it is reasonable to expect that – at least in ecological situations –
categories themselves need to be learnt from experience.
Some models address this issue by adopting a framework in
which categories emerge from clustering exemplars into groups
(Anderson, 1990; Griffiths et al., 2007). This is achieved following
normative principles such as the minimization/maximization of
differences among stimuli within/between groups, and taking
into account whether a large or small number of groups should
be favored. However, these sorts of approaches – based upon
stimulus statistics – do not consider the crucial link between
categories and actions. Indeed, categories emerge from stimulus
similarities independent of whether these similarities are action-
relevant. Also, as for all other theories presented so far, categories
are treated as context-invariant.
In summary, contemporary normative theories of
categorization present at least one of the following shortcomings:
categories are not learnt but established a priori; the stimulus-
category mapping is independent of behavioral relevance; once
learnt, the category structure and the stimulus-category mapping
are context insensitive; categories and actions are conflated in
such a way that a category always produces the same action.
Here, we propose a new model of categorization that attempts
to resolve these problems. We adopt a goal-directed perspective
in which biological organisms aim to occupy certain goal-states
associated with self-preservation (Rosenblueth et al., 1943; Miller
et al., 1960; Dickinson and Balleine, 1994; Pezzulo and Rigoli,
2011; Botvinick and Toussaint, 2012; Solway and Botvinick, 2012;
Friston et al., 2013, 2015; Pezzulo et al., 2013). This perspective
stresses the importance of connecting category learning with
behavioral relevance; insofar as classification is conceived as a
means to achieve goals rather than a goal per se. We propose
that agents have to categorize stimuli based on sensory evidence
in order to select an appropriate behavior. At the same time,
categorization requires computations that have benefits in terms
of goal achievement but also costs (e.g., metabolic, opportunity
costs, etc.) that need to be balanced against the benefits (Acuna
and Schrater, 2009; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Pezzulo et al., 2013;
Shenhav et al., 2013; FitzGerald et al., 2014).
The above principles are formalized within a Bayesian scheme,
where it is assumed that the brain builds a generative model of
sensory cues that are relevant to achieve the organism’s goals.
Indeed, from an enactivist perspective, the only raison d’être
for perceptual synthesis and categorization is to inform action,
which means that perception is itself inherently goal-directed.
The generative model underlying active categorization is learnt
through experience according to Bayesian model selection,
which necessarily selects models with an optimal accuracy-
complexity trade-off. This follows because (Bayesian) model
evidence can always be expressed as accuracy minus complexity.
Our main goal is to show that, from these basic normative
principles, a generative model with certain characteristics arises
where categories (1) are learnt based on their relevance for
behavior, (2) are context-dependent in such a way that in
different situations the same stimulus can be associated with
one category or another, (3) are distinct from actions in a way
that the same category can be associated with a certain action
in one context and with another action in another context, (4)
are organized hierarchically. Below, we present the theoretical
arguments in detail and discuss how they relate to other models
of categorization and with empirical research.
A THEORY OF CATEGORIZATION
Our theory follows recent formulations of the brain as a Bayesian
statistics engine (Dayan et al., 1995; Knill and Pouget, 2004;
Friston, 2005, 2010, 2012; Chater et al., 2006; Clark, 2013). We
assume that the brain implements a generative model of sensory
observations that is deployed to infer the latent causes of these
observations (Courville et al., 2006; Gershman and Niv, 2010;
FitzGerald et al., 2014). Our focus is on the characteristics a
generative model should have, taking into account the nature
of the physical world, the information relevant to achieve goals,
and the biological constraints of the brain. Below, we compare
different ways of instantiating the generative model and follow
a method to evaluate these implementations in terms of their
accuracy and complexity, following the principles of Bayesian
statistics (Hoeting et al., 1999; Bishop, 2006).
Generative models can always be represented with the
formalism of Bayesian graphs, in which nodes indicate variables
and arrows indicate conditional dependencies (Bishop, 2006).
All generative models comprise a perceptual layer of variables
associated with causes or features (F) generating observations.
Each node projects to an observation layer (O) that represents
sensory input. While the perceptual layer corresponds to an
estimate of the (hidden or unobserved) features, the observation
layer represents the sensory evidence for these features, with
the two layers connected in a probabilistic fashion. In our
formulation, a decision problem (i.e., choosing an appropriate
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action) is cast in terms of inferring the most likely action via
a posterior distribution over allowable actions. This (planning
as inference) approach has been described in detail previously
(Pezzulo and Rigoli, 2011; Botvinick and Toussaint, 2012;
Solway and Botvinick, 2012; Friston et al., 2013, 2015). Here,
an action variable (A) and a goal state variable (G) are
included in the generative model. The latter can assume two
values corresponding to whether a goal state (or reward) has
been attained or not. During inference, goals are treated as
observations (generally, as the prior probability distribution or
belief) and make it possible to infer the action that is most likely
given the goals (or, more generally, the prior belief that goals will
be attained or experienced). Note that action is not an observable
outcome but a (hidden) cause of goals and other observations.
This means action has to be inferred and can be thought of as a
policy or plan.
We consider alternative forms for generative models and
compare them in terms of the accuracy/complexity trade-off,
to establish which might be favored in ecological circumstances
(Hoeting et al., 1999; Bishop, 2006). In one candidate form
(Figure 1), there is a direct mapping from features to the goal
state, while in other models (Figures 2–4) a categorization
subsystem is inserted between goal states and features. This
FIGURE 1 | Generative model used in the first alternative instantiation.
A generative model is essentially a probabilistic description of how causes
generate consequences. Circles and arrows represent random variables and
conditional dependencies respectively. White and black circles represent
non-observed (causes) and observed variables (consequences) respectively.
F = features variables (four are considered in the example), which represent
hidden causes of feature of the world that generate outcomes observations;
O = observation variables, one per feature, which provide sensory evidence
about the features; A = action variable; G = goal variable. The goal variable is
an observable outcome, conceived as equal to one when a goal is achieved
and zero otherwise. In this implementation, feature variables map directly to
the goal without any intervening latent variables.
FIGURE 2 | The second form of generative model. This form is the same
as in the first implementation except that it includes: L = latent variable, which
represent the latent cause of sensory features. The latent variable – but not
the single features variables – project to (or cause) the goal state.
categorization layer includes variables representing the latent
causes of features (where features cause observations – including
observed goals). The categorization subsystem is either organized
hierarchically (Figures 3, 4) or not. In hierarchical forms, a lower-
order (and more specific) latent variable (L1) project to a subset
of feature variables and a higher-order (and more general) latent
variable (L2) project both to lower-order latent variables and
to other feature variables. Among models with a hierarchical
structure, a context variable (C) can be considered explicitly
(Figure 4) or not (Figure 3) and encodes different mappings from
latent variables (and action) to the goal variable.
Below, we compare and contrast these different forms and
evaluate them according to Bayesian statistics; namely, in terms
of their accuracy and complexity (Hoeting et al., 1999; Bishop,
2006). The former aspect relates to the ability of the generative
model to infer reliably the appropriate action, while the second
component relates to the number of parameters used to explain
observations. In keeping with Bayesian principles, we will
argue that an implementation with a similar level of accuracy
but a smaller degree of complexity (i.e., smaller number of
parameters) should be preferred. As noted above, maintaining
a high accuracy while minimizing complexity costs produces a
model with greater evidence (and minimizes its variational free
energy), in accord with Ockham’s principle (and the free energy
principle).
Crucially, our formal implementations present different
degrees of factorization, which changes the number of variables
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FIGURE 3 | Generative model used in the third implementation. This is
the same as the model used in the second implementation, except that it
entails a hierarchical structure: L1 = lower-order latent variable, representing
more specific classes; L2 = higher-order latent variable, representing more
generic classes. L2 projects to a subset of features (e.g., F1 and F2) and to L1.
L1 projects to other features (e.g., F3 and F4) and to the goal state.
and implicit complexity. In other words, introducing latent
variables can result in a smaller number of conditional
dependencies and therefore in a smaller number of (effective)
model parameters. Whether an implementation with high degree
of factorization should be favored depends on its accuracy; i.e.,
on whether it provides a parsimonious but accurate explanation
for outcomes (including goals). The key argument here is that
the state-action-outcome contingencies which unfold in the real
world mean that generative model with the greatest evidence (i.e.,
selected by evolution and learning) must be characterized by a
certain factorization structure – which should be reflected in the
brain structure (and function).
Before a particular generative model can be used for
inference, its structure (i.e., the variables, states, and conditional
dependencies) needs to be learnt. We will not go into the
processes underlying this (structure) learning. Here, our focus is
on the outcome of learning; namely, on justifying formally why
a certain model structure should, eventually, emerge from the
statistical structure of the world.
Why is Categorization Important?
Our perspective casts the fundamental computational problem
facing agents as inference in relation to an appropriate action,
given an expectation of goal attainment and evidence for sensory
features (Pezzulo and Rigoli, 2011; Botvinick and Toussaint,
2012; Solway and Botvinick, 2012; Friston et al., 2013, 2015). One
simple way to approach this problem is to use the generative
model shown in Figure 1 (Model one). This includes several
feature variables in the perceptual layer, each projecting to one
observation node, plus an action variable and an observable
goal-related outcome. Crucially, in this generative model, feature
variables map directly to the goal state. This differs from the
second generative model (Model two; shown in Figure 2), where
feature variables are caused by a latent variable, which in turn
maps to the goal state (see also Courville et al., 2006; Gershman
and Niv, 2010; FitzGerald et al., 2014). Which of these two
models is more plausible? The answer to this question depends
on the true causal structure of the environment (Collins and
Frank, 2013; Stoianov et al., 2015). If features are independent
of each other and different combinations of features need to be
considered to select an appropriate action, then adding a latent
variable does not help as either (i) the action selection process
would be less accurate or (ii) the latent variable would require
at least as many states as combinations over features to achieve
a sufficient level of accuracy, thus inducing a larger number
of model parameters (and hence more complexity). Consider
instead an alternative scenario, where the true features depend on
the same latent variable. In the case the state of the latent variable,
rather than the state of single features, is sufficient for inferring
an appropriate action, a model with latent variables is able to
obtain the same level of accuracy with minimal complexity, and
will be selected on the basis of its evidence. Note that this is
ubiquitous in ecological situations. For instance, a prey only
needs to infer the presence of a lion rather than the lion’s
individual characteristics; such as golden fur, long teeth or a
brown crest.
When true contingencies follow a latent cause structure, a
model that recapitulates this structure should be favored (by
natural selection, over evolutionary time and by the brain,
over somatic time) because of the smaller complexity cost.
One can show this formally by focusing on parameters of
the models that distinguish one model from another. We will
refer to these as characteristic parameters. In what follows, we
will associate the complexity with the number of parameters.
Strictly speaking, complexity is the Kullback–Leibler divergence
between the posterior and prior distributions over model
parameters; however, in the context of a large number of
observations, complexity can be shown to increase with the
number of free parameters. Indeed, this is the approximation
used by information criteria, such as the Akaike and Bayesian
information criteria (used in model selection). Furthermore, to
simplify things we will only consider the parameters encoding
beliefs about variables. Technically, these can be regarded as the
parameters of multinomial distributions over different sets of
categorical variables.
Under these simplifications, the characteristic parameters of
models one and two comprise all their parameters except those
related to the feature-observation mapping. Model one has
P1 = nFf nang characteristic parameters, while model two has
P2 = nFf nL1 + nL1nang , where F is the number of features, nf is
the number of states for each feature (for simplicity, here we
assume equal number of states for all features), na is the number
of states for the action, ng is the number of states for the goal
variable, and nL1 is the number of states for the latent variable
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FIGURE 4 | Generative model used in the fourth implementation. This is the same as the model used in the third implementation except that it comprises
contextual effects: C = context variable; OC = the sensory evidence about the context variable.
L1. If the condition P2 < P1 applies, then with simple algebraic
transformations we obtain:
nL1 <
nFf nang
nFf + nang
Taking the minimum values allowed for the quantities on the
right-hand side – namely, F = 2, nf = 2, na = 2 and, ng = 2
(because the minimum number of levels for a categorical variable
is 2) – the term on the right side of the formula is equivalent to
two, and hence this is necessarily equal to or smaller than nL1;
because L1 cannot have less than two states. Therefore, in this
case, Model one has the same or a smaller number of parameters
than Model two, and there is no reason to justify Model two.
However, if just one of the values on the right side of the formula
is larger than two, then nL1 can be smaller than the term on the
right side, and Model two will be favored; provided that it reflects
true environmental contingencies.
In sum, a generative model, in which several features are
mapped to a latent cause, is preferable in situations where this
model reflects true contingencies (Pezzulo and Calvi, 2011). It
is important to note that this condition is likely to be the rule
rather than the exception for biological systems. This is because
features are attributes of objects. For instance, color, shape,
and movement characteristic of a certain predator are usually
experienced together because they are caused by the presence
of the predator (a latent variable). This justifies the notion that
entertaining a generative model that contains latent variables
reduces complexity and is an ecological optimal strategy – insofar
as it allows organisms to suppress computational costs, while
maintaining the same accuracy. This, we argue, is the basic
normative principle behind categorization.
Why Are (Deep) Hierarchical Models
Important?
We now consider whether, and under which conditions, a
generative model with a hierarchical structure is favored. We
compare Model two (see Figure 2), with no hierarchy and Model
three (see Figure 3), where latent cause variables are organized
hierarchically. The latter comprises a higher order (and more
general) latent variable (L2) which causes a lower order (and
more specific) latent variable (L1), in turn connected to the
goal variable. The question addressed is whether a hierarchical
structure is useful and under which conditions. Consider having
to categorize an animal based on a noisy observation of five
features (head, body, teeth, nails, and limbs), each having two
possible states (small and big). Imagine that just by seeing the
shape of the limbs, teeth and nails, it is possible to distinguish
between herbivorous and carnivorous animals. At the same time,
other information (i.e., the shape of head and body) cannot
distinguish between herbivorous and carnivorous animals. This
represents an example where a hierarchy is more parsimonious
because (i) a subgroup of features is sufficient to classify
stimuli into (action-relevant) general classes (herbivorous and
carnivorous), (ii) another subgroup of features (the shape of head
and body) is irrelevant for the general classification, but maybe
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useful for a more specific classification (the animal identity). As
above, these considerations only apply if they are reflected in the
real contingencies generating observations.
To demonstrate the advantages of hierarchical organizations,
we focus on the characteristic parameters of the models, which
in this case comprise all parameters except those characterizing
the link among the higher order latent cause variable L1, the
action, and the goal, since these are common to both models.
Model two has P2 = nF1f 1 nF2f 2 nL1 characteristic parameters, where
F1 and F2 are the number of features associated with L1 and L2
respectively, and nf 1 and nf 2 are the number of states for each
feature for the first (linked with L1) and second (linked with L2)
subset of features respectively (for simplicity, we assume equal
numbers of states for all features in each subset). Model three has
P3 = nF2f 2 nL1nL2 + nF1f 1 nL1 characteristic parameters, where nL2 is
the number of states for the higher order latent cause L2. If the
condition P3 < P2 applies, then we obtain:
nL2 <
nF1f 1 nL1(n
F2
f 2 − 1)
nF2f 2 nL1
Taking the minimum values allowed for the quantities in the
right-hand side: F1= 2, F2= 2, nf 1= 2, nf 2= 2, nL1= 2, the term
on the right side of the formula is equivalent to one, and hence
this is necessarily smaller than nL2; because L2 cannot have less
than two states. Therefore, in this case, Model two has necessarily
a smaller number of parameters than Model three, and there is no
reason to justify Model three. However, for instance considering
the same values for the quantities on the right side of the formula
except that now F2 = 3, the right side of the formula is equal
to 3.5 and allows nL2 to be smaller than the term on the right
side, so that Model three can be favored if it reflects the true
environmental contingencies. For instance, if we go back to the
example above requiring the categorization of animals based on
visual cues, it is straightforward to show that Model two would
need 64 characteristic parameters (assuming two possible animal
identities, i.e., two states for L1), while Model three would only
need 40 characteristic parameters.
In sum, a hierarchical categorization structure should be
selected when certain, and not other, features are linked with
more general classes and need to be integrated with a second
group of features for more detailed perceptual classification. Note
that this condition characterizes most ecological situations.
Why Are Context and Action Important?
Recall the previous example, where categorization was based
on a noisy observation of four features (head, body, teeth, and
nails), each having two different possible states (small and big).
However, now we focus on the explicit action called for by
each category, for instance deciding whether to approach or
avoid the animal. Furthermore, the correct action depends on
the context, for instance avoiding a lion is appropriate in the
wild and approaching a lion is appropriate at the zoo. In this
situation, a model that does not include a context variable (Model
three) has to consider the context by adding further states to
the latent variable L1. In other words, in order to model the
influence of being in the wild or at the zoo, the number of
possible states of L1 would correspond to the number of possible
animals times two; i.e., the number of possible contexts (wild and
zoo). This increases complexity dramatically, favoring a model
where context is modeled as in Model four. Intuitively, if two
variables (e.g., context and content) can be factorized one can
either encode their joint occurrence with (marginal) probabilities
over both, or encode the joint distribution with a larger number
of parameters. Clearly, the former is much simpler and will afford
the same inference; provided the two variables are statistically
independent. A nice example of this is the segregation of dorsal
and ventral pathways in the brain to encode what and where
features (Friston and Buzsáki, 2016; Mirza et al., 2016). The key
thing here is that knowing what an object is does not depend (on
average) on where it is in the visual field – and vice versa.
To prove this more formally, we focus on the characteristic
parameters of Model three and four, which comprise all
parameters except those pertaining to the feature-observation
mapping and the mapping from L2 to the second subset of
features (since these are common to both models). Model
three has P3 = nF1f 1 nL1ngna characteristic parameters. However,
a contextual variable needs to be considered to achieve a
sufficient level of accuracy, and in Model three this influences
nL1, which now corresponds to nL1 = nl1nc, where nL1 is the
number of original states in the latent variable and nc is the
number of states for the context variable. Hence, we can rewrite
P3 = nF1f 1 nl1ncngna. Model four has P4 = nF1f 1 nl1 + nl1ncngna
characteristic parameters. Taking the minimum values allowed
for the variables above: F1 = 2, nf 1 = 2, nl1 = 2, nc = 2, ng
= 2, na = 2, then P3 = 64 and P4 = 24, therefore Model four
can always have less parameters than Model three, and should be
selected when it models the true environmental contingencies.
A similar point can be made to justify the inclusion of the
action variable. So far we have not discussed the role of the
action variable explicitly. We can reason that, with a one-to-
one mapping from latent variables to actions, in other words if
the same action is always correct given a particular latent cause,
there is no real need to add another variable to account for
action, as this would just increase complexity. However, with
the introduction of a context variable, which establishes whether
one action (e.g., approach or escape) should be performed
or not for any given stimulus, introducing an explicit action
variable reduces complexity. Indeed, precluding action as an
explicit variable would entail merging the action variable with
the latent variable L1, again increasing complexity compared
to a model where action is modeled explicitly. As above, this
argument rests upon the statistical independence or factorization
of the probability distributions over action and latent variables
(conditional upon any context).
More generally, the inclusion of an action and goal
state variable highlights the purposeful and active nature
of categorization. This is most evident in the fact that, in
our scheme, inference is necessary to estimate the posterior
probability over actions, and therefore a generative model is only
useful when an action needs to be selected; a condition requiring
that (1) more than one action is available and (2) only sensory
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features relevant for behavior are included in the generative
models. The first point implies that one action can be optimal
in one condition and another action in another condition. The
second point implies that sensory features that are never action-
relevant can be disregarded, explaining for instance why the
perceptual system of biological organisms ignores a large portion
of the visual and auditory spectrum.
In summary, when two variables – one assigned the role of
latent variable and the other the role of context – are statistically
independent and when the correct action depends on their joint
occurrence, the brain should select a generative model that
represents both the latent and context variable; thereby enabling
efficient inference about action. Finally, the inclusion of an
explicit action variable within the generative model is important
to highlight the active nature of inference and categorization.
Model Predictions
Our model has clear implications for research in the laboratory –
and here we present some key empirical predictions. First, our
model accounts for the evidence that living creatures can learn
categories from repeated experience with exemplars. This is not
trivial especially as some influential models of categorization
(Rosch, 1975; Homa et al., 1981; Nosofsky, 1986; Estes, 1994;
Smith and Minda, 1998; Lamberts, 2000) apply only to situations
where categories are given a priori (though note other models
account for category learning). A second prediction of our
framework is that category learning will be highly nuanced by
action. For example, consider two sets of stimuli with similar
perceptual features. In a condition where both sets require
performance of the same action, our model predicts that the
brain will represent both sets within the same category. On the
contrary, in a condition where sets of stimuli call for different
actions, our model predicts that the brain will represent these
sets as distinct categories. Though empirical evidence on this and
similar scenarios is scarce (Roach et al., 2017), investigating this
prediction seems relatively straightforward as in, for example,
asking participants to categorize a stimulus presented following
another stimulus. Our prediction is that prior exposure to a
stimulus will facilitate categorization to a higher degree if the
two stimuli have been previously associated with the same action.
Notably, this effect is not predicted by models of categorization
based on the notion that categories are learnt exclusively from
perceptual features (Anderson, 1990; Griffiths et al., 2007).
Along these lines, our model proposes also that categories
will be formed based on associated goals, beyond perceptual
similarity and stimulus-action associations. This is analogous to
the notion of ad hoc categories (Barsalou, 1983), which are built
around common goals (e.g., “things to sell at a garage sale” or
“things to take on a camping trip”) and not around perceptual
similarities. Research has supported the relevance of this type
of categorization (Barsalou, 1983; Barsalou, 2008), providing
evidence which is hard to reconcile with theories based on
perceptual features only (Anderson, 1990; Griffiths et al., 2007).
Another prediction derived from our model relates to the
fact that categories tend to be organized along a hierarchy, a
prediction consistent with empirical observations (Collins and
Quillian, 1969; Warrington, 1975). A hierarchical organization
is not easy to reconcile with many influential models of
categorization (Rosch, 1975; Homa et al., 1981; Ashby and
Townsend, 1986; Nosofsky, 1986; Ashby and Gott, 1988;
Anderson, 1990; Maddox and Ashby, 1993; Estes, 1994; Smith
and Minda, 1998; Lamberts, 2000). In our model this hierarchical
aspect derives from the fact that some features are linked with
more general classes and need to be integrated with a subordinate
set of features for more detailed perceptual classification.
One final prediction concerns the role of context. Several
influential models of categorization conceive categories as rigid
entities that remain fixed across different contexts. On the
contrary, our model predicts that categories will be highly
context-dependent (Barsalou et al., 2003; Barsalou, 2008). This
implies that the same stimulus can be associated with a set of
objects in one context and with a different set of objects in
another. Studies that directly elucidate the role of context during
categorization are rare (Barsalou et al., 2003; Barsalou, 2008), but
our emphasis on context-dependency is indirectly supported by
research on long-term memory (Tulving and Thomson, 1971;
Squire, 1986; Tulving, 2002), classical conditioning (Bouton,
1993), and evaluation processes (Rigoli et al., 2016a,b,c).
In summary, we argue that the modeling approach adopted in
this paper can motivate empirical research in several directions,
and can offer insights for interpreting available evidence. Here,
we have provided some examples that speak to novel and specific
empirical predictions arising from our theoretical proposal.
DISCUSSION
Categorization is a fundamental faculty of intelligent agents,
enabling them to save computational resources (eschewing the
storage of appropriate actions for all stimuli) and generalize an
adaptive behavioral repertoire to novel stimuli (by assimilating
new stimuli into extant categories) (Rosch, 1973; Rosch et al.,
1976). We propose a normative account of categorization, based
on fundamental Bayesian principles. Our premise is that the
brain (and natural selection) builds a generative model of sensory
inputs (that includes preferred outcomes or goals), which is
acquired according to the rules of Bayesian model selection. This
involves maximizing Bayesian model evidence (or minimizing
variational free energy) and entails trading-off accuracy and
complexity (Acuna and Schrater, 2009; FitzGerald et al., 2014).
This provides an opportunity to minimize complexity given the
nature of probabilistic encoding where the joint distribution
over statistically independent variables can be factorized in terms
of their marginal distributions. This factorization enables an
efficient (minimally complex) generative model that entails latent
variables arranged hierarchically together with explicit variables
representing action and context.
Ultimately, these structural characteristics emerge from a very
simple consideration; namely, that they reflect the state-action-
outcome contingencies that unfold during exchanges with the
environment. Indeed the environment is characterized by objects
which correspond to sets of correlated features. This motivates
the inclusion (in the generative model) of latent variables that
generate certain feature patterns and represent objects (Courville
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et al., 2006; Gershman and Niv, 2010; FitzGerald et al., 2014).
Objects share features with other objects – and this represents the
basis for more general (hierarchical) classification possibilities.
Here, we acknowledge the importance of taking these general
classifications into account through a hierarchical scheme of
latent causes, a further instance of factorization. In addition,
in the real world, whether an action is appropriate given a
certain object (i.e., the objects affordance) often depends on
the presence of other environmental features, which can be
conceived as context (Barsalou et al., 2003; Barsalou, 2008; Rigoli
et al., 2016a,b,c). This speaks to the explicit representations
of action and context in the generative model. Overall, we
propose that the real nature of the world and interaction between
the objects and the agent is the reason why the brain (and
evolution) has selected generative models for categorization with
the characteristics described here, under the assumption that the
brain (and evolution) follows Bayesian principles.
According to the Bayesian brain hypothesis, the basic tools
needed to perform inference (namely, the ability to generate,
implement, select and use generative models) must be supported
by the brain’s anatomy and physiology. The constant interchange
between the brain, the body and the environment is what
favors the selection of generative models – that necessarily show
increasing consistency with the agent-environment interaction.
Therefore, it is reasonable that, during development, generative
models become more and more accurate (under the constraint of
minimizing complexity). However, note that our proposal implies
that categorization performance will be sufficiently good, but
(as with models of bounded rationality) will not follow formal
logic rules (Oaksford and Chater, 2007). This is expected for at
least three reasons. First, the brain’s physiological constraints and
bounded computational resources limit the ability to model every
environmental contingency, entailing a systematic discrepancy
between inferred and true environmental dynamics. Second,
prior beliefs are often adaptive but may also induce biases and
errors if environmental contingencies change abruptly. Indeed,
the very process of learning is a testament to the persistent
suboptimality of our generative models. Third, the brain is
unlikely to perform exact Bayesian inference (or model selection),
but is more likely to implement approximate Bayesian inference
(and selection), such as free energy minimization (Friston, 2010),
which is based on factorization of posterior beliefs (known
technically as a mean field approximation). In short, optimality
in approximate Bayesian inference is a nuanced optimality that
probably accounts for the intractable nature of exact Bayesian
inference.
One especially important constraint is the agent’s action
repertoire, as ultimately categories are ways to classify objects
in behaviorally relevant ways. This is captured by our scheme,
in which sensory and action components are integrated within
a unifying generative model and action selection drives – and
is driven by – inference. The latter aspect explains the selective
nature of categorization insofar as sensory features irrelevant
for action selection are disregarded (i.e., are not a necessary
component of the generative model). Furthermore, this implies
that perceptual categorization should not be seen in conditions
where a single action is available.
Our account is closely related to previous normative models.
The proposal that categorization has a functional role – in saving
computational resources and generalizing adaptive behavior to
novel stimuli – can be already found in the seminal work of
Rosch (1973, 1975) and Rosch et al. (1976). Early computational
theories focus on the rules guiding the attribution of novel
stimuli to appropriate categories (Rosch, 1975; Homa et al.,
1981; Nosofsky, 1986; Estes, 1994; Smith and Minda, 1998;
Lamberts, 2000). We build on these theories by proposing
a Bayesian approach, which allows us to derive fundamental
proprieties of categorization, such as its link with action and
context and its hierarchical nature. A link with behavior has been
previously highlighted in multi-attribute decision theory (Ashby
and Townsend, 1986; Ashby and Gott, 1988; Maddox and Ashby,
1993) that casts categorization as partitioning a multidimensional
space of attributes based on the correct response associated
with each partition. This can be conceived as a more general
framework compared to the one pursued here; because it makes
minimal assumptions about the stimulus-action mapping. While
this can apply to any categorization problem, we restrict our
focus to real-world contexts. Our proposal is that the statistical
proprieties linking action with the world encourage the brain
to develop or select generative models with the characteristics
described here; namely, constraining the possible stimulus-action
mappings relevant for biological systems.
Recently, machine learning has seen an impressive
development in classification algorithms based on Bayesian
statistics. This approach has dramatically improved solving
problems relevant for categorization, like object recognition.
Interestingly, some of these algorithms use methods such as
neural networks which call on aspects of neurobiology and
highlight a similarity with brain functioning (e.g., Bishop, 2006;
Hinton et al., 2006; Anthony and Bartlett, 2009). However, one
limit is that the interpretation of the underlying mechanisms
is sometimes difficult. Indeed, despite excellent performance,
it is not straightforward to isolate the processes underlying the
functioning of many neural network algorithms (for instance,
how information is represented and processed), which is why
these models are often described as “black boxes” (Sjöberg et al.,
1995). Therefore, despite the importance of machine learning,
we believe that to investigate cognitive and biological systems,
it is equally important to study models where the underlying
processes can be isolated and understood in terms of explicit
generative models and Bayesian (variational) principles.
Our view is formally connected with recent proposals that
formulate decision-making and motor planning as Bayesian
inference (Pezzulo and Rigoli, 2011; Botvinick and Toussaint,
2012; Solway and Botvinick, 2012; Friston et al., 2013, 2015; Rigoli
et al., 2016b). In this perspective, action selection corresponds
to inferring the posterior probability of an action based on
a generative model, given evidence about the current state,
and based on “fictive” evidence about the future states and, in
some formulations, based on prior beliefs about future outcomes
(Friston et al., 2013, 2015). These prior beliefs or preferences
can be interpreted as the organism’s goals (cf. our goal variable
above). An in-depth discussion of this approach, compared to
standard decision-theory formulations, goes beyond the scope of
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the manuscript. However, the reason for using this perspective
here relies on the possibility of leveraging on the principles of
Bayesian model selection (i.e., the accuracy-complexity trade-
off) to explain why certain generative models better explain
agent-world exchanges – and thus provide an explanation as
to why particular model forms appear to be employed by the
brain. Though it might be possible to cast our reasoning in
terms of standard decision-theory formalisms, using a Bayesian
formulation appears a direct way to unify the inference and
decision steps and exploit the accuracy-complexity trade-off
principle to explain categorization, cortical hierarchies and,
indeed, functional segregation in the brain (see below).
Our model fits particularly well with Active Inference (Friston
et al., 2013, 2015; FitzGerald et al., 2014), a general formulation of
brain function, proposing an integration of perception and action
is explained by approximate Bayesian inference (or equivalently,
variational free minimization). A strong link between Active
Inference and the present theory is the integration of action
and perception within a unifying Bayesian inference scheme. In
addition – though our focus is not on the mechanisms underlying
inference and learning – we stress that free-energy minimization
is an important candidate for the inference processes mentioned
here, and has several advantages in terms of computational
efficiency and biological plausibility (Friston et al., 2013, 2015;
FitzGerald et al., 2014).
Our theory is also closely related to some recent
computational models of cognitive control (Collins and Frank,
2013; Stoianov et al., 2015). These implementations conceive
task sets (i.e., the mapping from stimuli to action associated
with reward) as latent causes that need to be inferred from the
observation of stimuli (called context) with a Dirichlet process
(Anderson, 1990; Griffiths et al., 2007). Common characteristics
of this and our theory are the explicit role of action selection and
the separation of stimuli from their latent causes. In addition,
these models propose an explicit mechanism for learning (i.e.,
the Dirichlet process). Here we pursue a different argument;
as we appeal to the principles of Bayesian model selection to
justify certain characteristics of the generative model, with some
characteristics common to the other theories (Collins and Frank,
2013; Stoianov et al., 2015) and other characteristics peculiar
to our formulation (for instance, the inclusion of multiple
perceptual features and the hierarchical organization of latent
causes).
One aspect of our theory is the importance of latent causes.
This has been stressed already in recent computational proposals
(Courville et al., 2006; Gershman and Niv, 2010; Collins and
Frank, 2013; FitzGerald et al., 2014; Stoianov et al., 2015;
Rigoli et al., 2016b). Our contribution clarifies further why
latent causes are important; namely, because they reduce the
complexity of the generative model by simplifying the encoding
of joint probabilities over features and action. For instance, it is
redundant to consider the shape, color, and smell of an animal
independently. It is better to first infer from these features the
animal’s identity – e.g., whether it is a predator – and then
select an appropriate action. The converse approach (namely, to
directly infer the features that explain every detail of sensory data)
is suboptimal. In statistics, this failure to minimize complexity
is known as ‘overfitting’ and, invariably, leads to a failure of
generalization, when the model is confronted with new data.
Another key characteristic of our proposal is the hierarchical
organization of the generative model. The idea of a hierarchical
category system has a long history, going back to Aristotle.
In cognitive science, it was proposed by early propositional
models of semantic representation (Collins and Quillian, 1969;
Warrington, 1975); where a hierarchy enabled one to store a
property shared by several objects only once (at the level of an
higher-order class) hence saving computational resources. With
the more recent criticism of propositional models, the interest
in explicit hierarchical schemes has declined (McClelland and
Rogers, 2003). For example, several prominent normative models
of categorization do not consider any hierarchy (Rosch, 1975;
Homa et al., 1981; Nosofsky, 1986; Estes, 1994; Smith and Minda,
1998; Lamberts, 2000). Here, we reprise this concept within a
new framework, where latent causes are arranged hierarchically.
The motivation for implementing a hierarchy is the suppression
of complexity; because some features of the stimulus can be
captured by a simple higher order category. Note that hierarchies
can be potentially organized into multiple levels, accounting for
the fact that classification can be represented along a taxonomy
tree (e.g., from a living organism, an animal, a mammalian, a
dog, to my dog). This aspect of our model resonates with the
original idea of a categorical hierarchy and sheds new light on
its characteristics. The same justification of hierarchical models,
advocated here in relation to features, can be generalized to
action and goal variables, establishing a link, for instance, with
hierarchical reinforcement learning (Barto and Mahadevan, 2003;
Botvinick et al., 2009; Rigoli et al., 2016b). Our argument is
also relevant for neurobiological theories of hierarchical brain
organization (Friston, 2005, 2010; Pezzulo et al., 2015), raising the
possibility that the functional segregation might reflect distinct
representations of latent causes or clusters of latent causes,
which are independent (and processed in parallel) or organized
hierarchically (and processed along a neural hierarchy) (Friston
and Buzsáki, 2016; Mirza et al., 2016).
In relation with the relevance of our model for how
categorization is realized in the brain, we stress that our level
of analysis is computational, according to the influential Marr’s
taxonomy. Though our proposal is relevant for both algorithmic
and implementation (i.e., neural) levels, we stress that there is
no necessary one-to-one mapping between different levels of
analysis. In other words, algorithmic or computational schemes
need to be consistent with a normative proposal, but more than
one scheme can fit with that proposal. Indeed, we have covertly
appealed to very diverse mechanisms (experience-dependent
plasticity during neurodevelopment and natural selection during
evolution) in mediating Bayesian model selection – and the
minimization of complexity.
A remarkable neuropsychological observation is that brain
damage sometimes induces category-specific impairments
(Warrington and McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington and
Shallice, 1984). For example, some patients exhibit categorization
deficits specifically for living but not for non-living things,
or vice versa. Sensory-functional theory (Warrington and
McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington and Shallice, 1984) explains
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these findings by distinguishing between visual/perceptual
and associative/functional subsystems in the brain, with the
former involved in categorizing living things and the latter in
categorizing non-living things. This view stands in contrast to
the domain-specific hypothesis (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998;
Caramazza and Mahon, 2003) which explains category-specific
deficits in terms of pre-wired neural circuits for processing innate
categories such as “animals,” “fruits/vegetables,” “conspecifics,”
and “tools.” Overall, the key difference between sensory-
functional and domain-specific theory relies on the emphasis
on ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes, respectively. While
this debate is largely a matter of empirical research, the
theory we propose here is potentially consistent with both
views. In fact, our proposal is that learning is Bayesian
(with all the ensuing implications presented here), but it
does not preclude a substantial contribution to learning from
evolution (i.e., optimization of the generative model through
natural (Bayesian model) selection, as implied by domain-
specific theory) in addition to a role played by experience
(i.e., optimization of the generative model through experience
dependent learning, as implied by sensory-functional theory). In
other words, Bayesian category learning (at least at some level)
may proceed at both an evolutionary and somatic timescales,
a core premise of co-evolutionary theory (Kauffman and
Johnsen, 1991; Rosenman and Saunders, 2003; Traulsen et al.,
2006).
Although evolution may play an important role (for example,
providing the prior knowledge before experience is accumulated),
our theory stresses that categories are largely experience-
dependent. Before a generative model can be used effectively
to perform inference, its structure and parameters need to be
learnt from experience. Though how this occurs is still poorly
understood (Acuna and Schrater, 2009; Dolan and Dayan, 2013;
Pezzulo et al., 2013, 2015, 2016; FitzGerald et al., 2014; Friston
et al., 2016) and falls beyond our present remit; we conceive
of learning as a model comparison or selection process that
eventually favors a generative model with the characteristics
of simplicity and accuracy; i.e., self evidencing (Hohwy, 2016).
Model comparison based upon model evidence (or free energy)
implies an optimal accuracy-complexity trade-off. While the
burden associated with complexity can be intuitively connected
with factors like metabolic and time costs, a more fundamental
problem is overfitting, which is a pure statistical concept. In
other words – in Bayesian statistics – complexity is penalized
simply because a model with too many parameters explains new
data poorly. The approximate Bayesian inference, self-evidencing
premise we adopt is that complexity minimizing processes are
implemented in the brain. For example, this perspective has
been pursued to explain the synaptic homoeostasis seen during
sleep (Tononi and Cirelli, 2006). See Hobson and Friston (2012)
for a full discussion of synaptic regression and complexity
minimization in this context.
In summary, we propose a theory of categorization based
on the principle that the brain performs Bayesian inference to
achieve goals. This theory integrates motivational and perceptual
aspects within a unifying framework, and, from the Bayesian
principle of trading off model accuracy and complexity, derives
important aspects of categorization; such as the inclusion of
latent variables, a hierarchical organization, and the explicit
representation of context and action. The formulation may help
in conceptualizing the computational functions of categorization
and their link with brain structure and function.
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